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Abstract: It has been suggested that economics could benefit greatly from recent 
developments in evolutionary game theory. In fact, key authors in the study of the 
role of ethical norms in economic behavior like Amartya Sen argue that 
evolutionary game theory could contribute much to the study of social norms and 
behavior. Others have suggested that evolutionary game theory could be most 
helpful for formalizing the work of classic authors in evolutionary and institutional 
economics like Thorstein Veblen. Here I discuss the behavioral assumptions of 
evolutionary game theory models, and Jörgen Weibull’s approach in particular. I 
will argue that Weibull’s models, and evolutionary game theory in general, pose 
overly strong restrictions on the explanation of human behavior, which limit the 
potential of evolutionary explanation. I also suggest Tony Lawson’s population-
variety-reproduction-selection (PVRS) model as an alternative evolutionary 
framework that can successfully accommodate developments in behavioral 
economics, while also providing a solution to important critiques of Darwinian 
evolutionary analysis made by Richard Nelson, among others. 
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Evolutionary game theory has been rapidly expanding within the economic literature, 
and has become an important part of mainstream economics. The expansion of this 
approach raises two important questions. One of them concerns the role that 
evolutionary game theory can play in the development of existing approaches in 
evolutionary economics. Mauricio Villena and Marcelo Villena (2004), for example, 
suggest the use of evolutionary game theory in order to formalize older traditions in 
evolutionary economics, such as original institutional economics, and the work of 








































prominent traditions within evolutionary economics, such as the neo-Schumpeterian 
approach of Richard Nelson and Sidney Winter (1982). 
Another crucial question is whether evolutionary game theory can help with 
developing the study of social behavior in general, and the analysis of ethical behavior 
and social norms. Amartya Sen (1997), for example, argues that evolutionary game 
theory can provide significant contributions to the study of “conventional rule-
following.” Other examples of this perspective are the works of Ken Binmore and 
Larry Samuelson (1994) and Robert Sugden (2001a, 2001b). 
However, there are several problems with evolutionary game theory that must be 
addressed in this connection. First, many assumptions made in evolutionary game 
theory are inconsistent with Sen’s own analysis, or with the work of central authors of 
evolutionary economics, including authors of the original institutional tradition like 
Veblen, or authors of the neo-Schumpeterian tradition like Nelson (1995). (Nelson, 
in fact, criticizes evolutionary game theory.) 
Second, most evolutionary game theory relies upon the notion of “average” 
agents, or agents whose characteristics are “averaged” (see, for example, Binmore and 
Samuelson 1991, 1994; Selten 1991; Weibull 1995). Now, in Darwinian evolutionary 
analysis, variety has a crucial importance for explanation. Hence, to impose a priori 
restrictions on variety, such as requiring that agents engage in “average” behavior 
(where this average behavior is a consequence of some uniformity of the 
characteristics of the agents), constrains the explanatory power of any Darwinian 
model. 
I will argue that Tony Lawson’s (2003) population-variety-reproduction-selection 
(PVRS) model provides a solution to these problems. Furthermore, the PVRS model 
also provides a solution to some limitations of Darwinian evolutionary analysis 
identified by Richard Nelson (2006). When discussing evolutionary game theory, I 
will refer to Jörgen Weibull’s (1995) account of evolutionary game theory that is 
particularly relevant for the issues addressed here. 
 
Evolutionary Game Theory and Social Behavior 
 
Evolutionary game theory has been rapidly expanding within economic analysis, and 
is now widely accepted in mainstream economics. As the name indicates, this 
approach brings insights from evolutionary theory into game theory to provide a 
better understanding of the evolution of social behavior. 
A first crucial distinction brought from evolutionary theory is the distinction 
between phenotype and genotype. Phenotypes are the individuals in competition in the 
environment of selection, and may differ according to their particular genotype. In 
biology, the term genotype refers to the genetic constitution of the individual, and 
consists of the individual’s characteristics that are ultimately selected through the 
selection of phenotypes. 
In social theory, the entities through which the interaction with the 
environment of selection occurs are often called interactors (following Hull 1981), and 
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termed replicator (following Dawkins 1976, 1978).  One prominent type of 
evolutionary model is a Darwinian model. Four elements are needed to describe a 
Darwinian population model: (i) a population of phenotypes; (ii) a variety-generating 
mechanism (that generates different genotypes in the population of phenotypes); (iii) 
a reproduction mechanism (that transmits each genotype from one phenotype to 
another); and (iv) a selection mechanism (through which the phenotype is selected in 
the environment of selection). Note that, even though one is ultimately analyzing 
which genotypes (and replicators) are selected, such selection happens through the 
phenotype (and the interactor) that corresponds to each genotype (and to each 
replicator). Following Lawson (2003, 121-123), a Darwinian PVRS model can be 
defined as any model that contains these four features, together with some degree of 
independence between variety-generating mechanisms and selection mechanisms. 
Different types of evolutionary models can be found in evolutionary game 
theory literature. Sen’s (1997) reference to evolutionary game theory as a useful tool 
to explain conventional rule appeared in his paper, “Maximization and the Act of 
Choice.” In it, the most comprehensive account of evolutionary game theory that Sen 
references is Weibull’s 1995 book, Evolutionary Game Theory, which will be the 
evolutionary game theory conception I focus on here (but see Elsner [2012] on more 
recent contributions not mentioned by Sen [1997] that could require a different 
analysis, not least in the context of institutionalist analysis). 
There are some advantages in Sen’s referring to Weibull’s account. In Sen’s 
(1987, 2002) own view, social rules of conduct are irreducible to atomistic interaction 
of agents who permanently engage in utility optimization. In most game theory 
analyses, on the other hand, agents are assumed to permanently engage in optimizing 
behavior, and social rules are derived from (and ultimately reduced to) the atomistic 
interaction of utility optimizing agents (see Martins 2009, 2013, ch. 6). 
Weibull does use utility functions when conceptualizing evolutionary stable 
strategies that could be relevant to the study of what Sen terms a conventional rule-
following. But Weibull also uses other concepts, such as replicator dynamics and 
selection dynamics, which do not presuppose that agents necessarily engage in 
permanent utility optimization like other approaches in game theory do. 
Robert Sugden (2001a) criticizes evolutionary game theory approaches for not 
going beyond the basic tenets of standard game theory. But in Weibull’s models, 
when conceptualizing the replicator dynamics and selection dynamics (to be discussed 
later), agents simply follow rules that might not lead to optimal outcomes at every 
moment, and only review them at a constant average rate (not permanently). Hence, 
Weibull’s framework is more compatible with Sen’s view than most game theory 
models are. 
I will not attempt a detailed explanation of Weibull’s models (for details, see 
Weibull 1995), but, for the present purposes, my emphasis will be on what Weibull 
calls the “formal modeling of social evolution of behaviors in a population of 
strategically interacting agents” (Weibull 1995, 152). This concept contains the 
aspects of Weibull’s perspective that are relevant to my analysis. In particular, 
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understanding whether evolutionary game theory can help explain conventional rule-
following, as Sen suggests. Of course, one can find a much richer variety of 
evolutionary models in Weibull’s work, and in evolutionary game theory in general, 
which apply to many contexts other than the social evolution of behavior. For 
example, models have been developed in the study of biology (see Maynard Smith 
1982; Maynard Smith and Price 1973), though, again, my emphasis here is only on 
the models that Weibull suggests in the context of the evolution of social behavior. 
The use of evolutionary theory has a long tradition in economics, going back at 
least to the contributions of original institutional economists, such as Thorstein 
Veblen. However, the evolutionary analysis undertaken by original institutional 
economists differs significantly from the more formalized analysis of modern 
evolutionary game theorists. Nevertheless, Villena and Villena (2004) argue that even 
original institutionalists have much to gain by turning to evolutionary game theory, 
while referring to Weibull’s approach in particular, especially in the way it could 
provide a useful formalization of Veblen’s work. 
It can certainly be conceded that Weibull’s evolutionary game theory is more 
compatible with institutional economics — and with evolutionary analysis in general — 
than with other contributions in game theory analysis. The assumption that agents 
permanently optimize — as presupposed in standard game theory — and that all 
behavior is to be explained as the outcome of utility optimization leaves little (if any) 
room for notions like “habits of thought” or conventional rule-following behavior that 
are very common in institutional (and evolutionary) economics (for example, in the 
work of Veblen). 
In fact, Veblen (1898a) has strongly criticized the view of human agents as being 
driven by the pursuit of utility, happiness, or hedonistic desires. According to Veblen, 
human agency cannot be understood as a reaction to subjective valuations, such as 
utility. In Weibull’s evolutionary game theory analysis, on the other hand, there is no 
need to assume that agents permanently engage in such optimizing behavior (even 
though the utilitarian subjective valuation that Veblen rejects is still present in the 
payoff function). Nevertheless, Weibull’s conception also raises some problematic 
issues that I will discuss here. Before doing so, however, I will describe Weibull’s 
approach in more detail. 
 
Weibull’s Evolutionary Models 
 
In Weibull’s evolutionary models, each agent is “programmed” to play a given 
strategy. This strategy is the replicator (which is passed from each individual to 
his/her offspring). In biology, the game’s payoffs represent the “fitness” of the 
individual (measured as the number of “offspring” that are generated by the 
individual). This “offspring” will follow the strategies that the individual person, who 
has generated them, did, thereby “replicating” the strategy. Under this framework, a 
given strategy is said to be evolutionary stable if there is a share of individuals in the 
population following this strategy, so that the payoff these individuals get from 
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other individuals (see Weibull 1995, 36; for a general discussion of the concept of 
evolutionary stable strategy, see also Maynard Smith 1982; Maynard Smith and Price 
1973; and for a more recent discussion, see Elsner, Heinrich and Schwardt 2015). 
Evolutionary stability criteria help us understand how a given equilibrium is 
maintained. However, as used in standard evolutionary game theory, these criteria do 
not explain how strategies change through time (for an alternative approach, see 
Lindgren 1997). The social evolution of behavior in a population of strategically 
interacting agents is explained through what Weibull calls the “replicator dynamics” 
and the “selection dynamics.” The latter are modeled as systems of differential 
equations, showing how population shares (which are programmed according to a 
given replicator, i.e., a given strategy) evolve through time and which agents are 
selected (and so, which corresponding replicators are selected). 
Weibull defines “xi” as the share of agents in the population who follow strategy 
“i” (that is, who are pre-programmed to play strategy “i”); “ri(x)” as the average time 
rate at which agents that follow strategy “i” revise their strategies; and “pi
j(x)” as the 
probability that, when revising strategies, agents will switch from strategy “i” to 
strategy “j.” Also, Weibull argues that agents may be human individuals, firms, or 
other social or economic units. He then describes a population dynamics where the 




      (1) 
 
On the other hand, the outflow of agents switching from the share of agents that plays 




      (2) 
 
Then, the population dynamics is given by the difference between equation (1) and 
equation (2). 
Weibull suggests various forms of modeling “ri(x),” the “average review rates” of 
agents who follow some strategy “i,” and the probability “pi
j(x)” of changing from 
some strategy “i” to strategy “j.” This framework enables Weibull to formulate a wide 
variety of evolutionary models, whereby replication by imitation, or change of strategy 
due to dissatisfaction, are modeled, depending on how the parameters (that is, the 
“average review rate” and the “probability of changing strategies”) are interpreted. The 
social situations with which these models are concerned are thus the cases of 
imitation and changes due to dissatisfaction with a given strategy. 
However, all the dynamic models discussed by Weibull share the same structure 
— one where variations in shares of populations are given by the difference between 
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average review rate, and the probability of changing strategy. Since the issues to be 
addressed here concern this general structure — and the conclusions to be obtained 
about it also apply to each particular model that can be set using the same structure — 
the more detailed analysis of each particular model should be left for another 
occasion. 
 
The Empirical Relevance of Behavioral Assumptions of Evolutionary Game 
Theory 
 
Daniel Kahneman (2003) distinguishes between two types of processes in human 
cognition. He (2003, 1451) names one type of processes “automatic,” characterizing 
them as “fast, automatic, effortless, associative, and often emotionally charged,” 
“governed by habit,” and thus “difficult to control or modify.” These processes are 
associated with cognitive activities like perception and intuition. The other type of 
processes, Kahneman (2003, 1451) calls “controlled” processes, which are “slower, 
serial, effortful, and deliberately controlled,” as well as “relatively flexible.” 
Weibull’s models capture these two types of processes by assuming that agents 
typically engage in “automatic” processes and undertake “controlled” processes of 
rational decision-making at an “average review rate” given by “ri(x).” When 
undertaking such “controlled” processes of rational decision-making, there will be a 
probability of changing strategy given by “pi
j.” Thus, unlike traditional game theory 
and traditional microecononomics, Weibull’s approach — at least, when studying the 
replicator dynamics and selection dynamics — does not lead to a study of human 
behavior in terms of a single preference ordering, which can be described by a utility 
function that reflects the players’ payoffs. 
This renders Weibull’s perspective on the replicator dynamics and selection 
dynamics immune to Sen’s criticisms of mainstream economics. Sen (1982, 1987, 
1997, 2002) has argued in different contexts that preferences can be (and often are) 
incomplete, meaning that they cannot be represented by a utility function in many 
cases. Sen contends that, because of the existence of a complex set of goals and values 
(e.g., social commitment, morality, or self-interest), one preference ordering is not 
sufficient to describe the outcome of the multiple motivations at play in human 
action.  
Veblen (1898a) also criticized the neoclassical conception of the economic agent, 
and described the human agent as being driven by a multiplicity of instincts and 
habits. Some instincts Veblen (1898b, 1899, 1914) discussed are the instinct of 
workmanship, the instinct of self-preservation, the parental bent, and idle curiosity, 
each of them leading to different patterns of action. 
In fact, it seems that Weibull himself disagrees with the notion of agency used in 
most microeconomic theory. Weibull (1995) states: 
 
The standard interpretation of noncooperative game theory is that the 
analyzed game is played exactly once by fully rational players who know all 
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Evolutionary game theory, instead, imagines that the game is played over 
and over again by biologically or socially conditioned players who are 
randomly drawn from large populations. (Weibull 1995, xiii) 
 
Weibull’s criticism also applies to (dynamic) repeated games, since the agents have to 
set a complete strategy at the beginning (on how Sen’s critique of game theory also 
applies to repeated games, see Martins 2009). 
A crucial question concerns whether the multiplicity of (biologically and social 
conditioned) human motivations generates any stability of the parameters used in 
Weibull’s analysis. The existence of conflicting motivations would not preclude the 
possibility of describing average behavior in terms of constant parameters (such as 
review rates and probabilities of changing strategy), if one could estimate the relative 
effects of each motivation on parameters like the average review rate given by “ri(x),” 
and the probability of changing strategy given by “pi
j.” 
However, the interaction between the different motivations may be complex 
enough to undermine this prospect. In fact, Veblen (1914) himself argued that, 
although there are different physiological traits that could hypothetically be 
distinguished at a physiological level, their effects on human instincts and behavior 
overlap and interfere with each other to different degrees, with enough complexity to 
preclude any possibility of differentiating them in an exact way at the psychological 
level. Veblen referred to this phenomenon as the “contamination of instincts,” and 
argued that: 
 
[No] instinctive disposition works out its functional content in isolation 
from the instinctive endowment at large. The instincts, all and several, 
though perhaps in varying degrees, are so intimately engaged in a play of 
give and take that the work of any one has its consequences for all the rest, 
though presumably not for all equally. It is this endless complication and 
contamination of instinctive elements in human conduct, taken in 
conjunction with the pervading and cumulative effects of habit in this 
domain that makes most of the difficulty and much of the interest 
attaching to this line of inquiry. (Veblen 1914, 28-29) 
 
Here Veblen’s reference to “cumulative effects” means also that small changes in 
human conduct may lead to larger changes progressively, and to further difficulties in 
disentangling the interplay of each instinct. If Veblen’s idea of “contamination of 
instincts” is correct, parameters like the average review rates and probabilities of 
changing strategy will not have enough stability to be represented by the replicator 
dynamics and the selection dynamics as constants, given the existence of conflicting 
motivations. Also, Sen does not seem to adopt a conception where behavior must 
have the stability implied in a constant average review rate and a constant probability 
of changing strategy. 
Thus, it seems that while Weibull’s approach does not suffer from many of the 
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render the latter incompatible with Veblen and Sen’s analysis, it also suffers from 
some limitations. Note that the problem of lack of stability resulting from the process 
through which changes in strategy take place cannot be solved in general by resorting 
to multi-population models that share the general structure presented above (which 
Weibull [1995, 186-190] also describes in detail). It is true that multi-population 
models introduce heterogeneity and variety between agents. However, the existence of 
multiple psychological processes within each individual agent, which is in line with 
Veblen and Sen’s own conceptions, is not addressed by multi-population models. 
Multi-population models take into account the different review rates and 
probabilities of changing strategies of several agents (each belonging to a different 
population), but each agent is assumed to have constant parameters just like in a 
single population model. A further difficulty lies in the fact that, as the number of 
populations increases, multi-population models become progressively less tractable. 
Furthermore, one should be reminded of the possibility of small effects that 
cumulatively lead to a radically different social conduct, which is central to Veblen’s 
own understanding of socio-economic reality as an evolutionary process of cumulative 
change. Veblen’s notion of cumulative effects in this context means that if the choice 
of strategies depends on the strategies of others, a small change of strategy of one 
agent, leading to changes in the strategies of other agents, may have cumulative effects 
that generate a completely different evolutionary stable strategy from the ones 
conceived a priori. 
Effectively, as a central author of the neo-Schumpeterian tradition (that, 
together with institutional economics, is one of the most prominent traditions in 
evolutionary economics), Richard Nelson notes how, 
 
for the most part (there are exceptions) evolutionary game theory continues 
an older tradition in game theory of thinking of a given finite set of (basic) 
strategies, with equilibrium being defined in terms of these or mixes of 
these. In contrast, in the more general formulation an equilibrium, if there 
is any such, is seen as emerging out of the dynamic process, and often 
involves patterns of behavior and activities that were absent early in the 
process. The number and nature of possible equilibria thus often cannot 
be specified ex ante. (Nelson 1995, 52) 
 
Robert Sugden (2001a) goes further in arguing that evolutionary game theory, like 
standard game theory, remains essentially an a priori endeavor that does not actually 
explain processes of replication. 
Of course, multi-population models are nevertheless more realistic because they 
allow for heterogeneity between competing populations. Moreover, the concept of an 
evolutionary stable strategy is a polymorphism that can accommodate a wide diversity 
of strategies, including mixed ones. Using mixed strategies, it would be possible to 
formalize conflicting preferences. This procedure would be possible in situations 
where the vector of probabilities attached to each pure strategy is stable enough to 
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But the concept of an evolutionary stable strategy does not include a dynamic 
dimension, which is introduced only in the specification of the replicator dynamics 
and the selection dynamics. This, in turn, leads to the difficulties mentioned above in 
specifying its parameters, and denying the possibility of the emergence of new 
strategies and replicators, as Nelson (1995) notes. On the other hand, the social 
evolution of strategies, which is modeled through the replicator dynamics and the 
selection dynamics, requires very strong assumptions, such as the constancy of 
parameters like the average review rate and the probability of changing strategy. 
 
Identifying Evolutionary Causation 
 
The concepts of replicator dynamics and selection dynamics used in evolutionary 
game theory provide models that are very useful whenever Veblen’s “cumulative 
effects,” “contamination of instincts,” or the existence of (what in neuropsychology is 
termed) “modularity” do not affect the stability of parameters like the average review 
rate and the probability of changing strategy. Likewise, evolutionary stability criteria 
can explain evolutionary stability when the vector of probabilities attached to each 
pure strategy is at least approximately constant.  
But the stability of motivations required in evolutionary game theory is a strong 
condition that cannot be guaranteed in general. When such a condition does not 
exist, what alternative is there for evolutionary theorizing in economics to achieve a 
general model of social evolution that takes into account the “cumulative effects,” 
“contamination of instincts,” or “modularity”? I will refer now to three conditions 
that a Darwinian evolutionary model of human action should satisfy in order to have 
an explanatory power. I will then argue that Lawson’s PVRS model meets all of these 
conditions, whereas Weibull’s evolutionary game theory conception does not. 
A first — I will term it — condition (a) is that, when using evolutionary models as 
explanatory frameworks, there must be a stable relationship between the replicator 
and either the phenotype or the interactor, so that the replicator can be identified. 
Because, if the replicator was not stable and it was changing because of other 
exogenous factors, evolutionary causation could not be separated from those 
exogenous factors and identified. This condition is essential for the identification of 
replicators in a Darwinian model. 
A second condition (b) is that no artificial restrictions are placed on the 
existence of variety. That is, no restrictions on the existence of variety should be 
placed in addition to those that might already exist in a given sphere of reality. A 
Darwinian evolutionary population model of the sort advanced by original 
institutionalists like Veblen can have much stronger explanatory power when one uses 
models with a wide heterogeneity of individuals — meaning, when phenotypes are 
diverse, i.e., contain different genotypes. Sen (1999) also stresses how diversity is a 
fundamental aspect of reality, not an additional complication that can be temporarily 
ignored. So, assumptions that artificially constrain the existing variety should be 
avoided. 
In Weibull’s models, there are no differences between agents of a population 
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rate,” and, when so doing, all agents in such a population change strategies with the 
same probability. In fact, the dynamics of Weibull’s models would be very hard (if not 
impossible) to model if this hypothesis of homogeneity of agents was not assumed. In 
other words, one would need a multi-population model with an extremely large 
number of parameters and simulations of a wide range of scenarios that may not 
cover all the relevant issues at stake. Thus, instead of a population of heterogeneous 
agents, in Weibull’s models, one has a population of homogeneous agents. Thus, by 
positing a priori a situation of restricted variety, Weibull’s models artificially constrain 
the explanatory power of Darwinian analysis. 
A third condition (c) is that a realistic model of human action, in which the 
latter have the possibility of choice, must allow for the fact that each human agent 
may revise and choose differently at any moment, not necessarily at constant rates and 
probabilities, in a context where these constant rates and probabilities do not change 
within agents of the same population. Weibull assumes that the revision of strategies, 
when occurring at all, is exercised at a given constant rate that is the same for all 
individuals of the same population. Weibull also posits that, when revising strategies, 
the probability of changing strategies is also a constant parameter. But, as I argue 
earlier, this is an unrealistic assumption that places strong limitations on human 
behavior and restricts the possibility of conceptualizing variety. 
This issue becomes even more pressing for authors like Sen (2002), who support 
evolutionary game theory models, but simultaneously place freedom of choice and the 
irreducibility of human behavior to exact regularities at the center of their analysis. If 
one assumes that each individual person is “pre-programmed” to play a given 
predefined strategy (revising it at some constant “average review rate”), as Weibull 
does, this conception would be inconsistent with most of Sen’s writings. 
Sen (2002) defends a different conception of rationality to the one often 
assumed in game theory. He takes rationality to be the (not permanently exercised) 
discipline of scrutinizing goals and values, whereby human agents have the capacity of 
engaging in reasoned scrutiny and choosing differently at any time. In Sen’s view, 
reasoned scrutiny (which may lead to changes in behavior) does not occur at a 
constant “average review rate,” with the persistent probability of changing rules when 
reviewing them. Rather, it is essential to Sen’s thinking that reasoned scrutiny, as 
constant need, can occur at any time (even though it does not permanently occur). 
This inconsistency springs from simultaneously recognizing the possibility that 
freedom of choice can be exercised at any moment, while also assuming that the exact 
regularities of actual behavior, demanded by evolutionary game theory analysis, also 
occurs when attempting to combine evolutionary game theory models with other 
evolutionary economics approaches (like the original institutional perspective). Even 
though original institutional contributions emphasize the role of institutions and 
“habits of thought” in human behavior, it does  not follow from this emphasis that 
either these social forces determine human behavior, or that social forces and “habits 
of thought” manifest themselves in a constant and predictable way.  
Furthermore, since human agency may be a source of variety (which adds to the 
variety that may already exist in reality), limitations to condition (c) also pose 
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model of human action that fulfils conditions (a), (b), and (c), arguing that the PVRS 
model offers a more promising starting point for such an endeavor than Weibull’s 
models (and evolutionary game theory in general).  
 
The PVRS Model 
 
Weibull’s assumption of constant (average) review rates and a constant probability of 
changing strategies enables him to verify condition (a) — the stability of the replicator. 
In Weibull’s models, each replicator corresponds to the same agent, and if the former 
changes (when agents revise strategies), a revision can be exactly modeled and 
predicted since it occurs at a constant rate and with a constant probability of change 
(and these constant parameters are known and are the same within individuals of the 
same (sub-)population). This guarantees that evolutionary causation can be exactly 
modeled, identified, and isolated from exogenous factors. 
Even though Weibull’s models satisfy condition (a), the way in which these 
models achieve such a result prevents them from fulfilling conditions (b) and (c). The 
problem is that, because the replicator must be stable (condition (a)), then agents 
(human individuals, firms, or other social or economic units) must either engage in 
the same strategy over time, or, if they decide to change strategy, agents’ decision must 
be exactly modeled based on a constant (average) review rate and a constant 
probability of changing strategies. Otherwise, it would be difficult to separate such 
decisions from evolutionary causation. 
This emphasis on exact modeling of agents can also be found in most (if not all) 
evolutionary game theory contributions — for example, in the work of some of the 
most prominent theorists in the field, such as Ken Binmore and Larry Samuelson 
(1991, 1994) and Reinhard Selten (1991). However, this is an unnecessary limitation 
to an evolutionary account of human behavior along the lines of authors like Veblen, 
or even authors who are supportive of evolutionary game theory like Sen. 
Now, a solution to this problem would be to identify some stable relationship 
not between the replicator and the agents, but between the replicator and another 
entity — for example, a different interactor. In such a case, the agents (human 
individuals, firms, or other social or economic units) need neither have their 
characteristics averaged, nor be subject to uniform regularities of behavior. The 
stability of the replicator will be ensured at another level — through its 
correspondence to another interactor. 
The question is: What entity will this interactor be, and how can it be related to 
the replicator in a stable way without imposing unnecessary constraints on the 
characteristics or  behavior of the agents? Tony Lawson (2003) argues that social 
practices are the most promising feature of the social realm to be used as a social 
interactor. “[I]t seems to me that a certain category of social phenomena does stand 
out more than others as a promising candidate for the set of social interactors we are 
looking for here. I refer to social practices” (Lawson 2003, 127, emphasis original). 
So, instead of using a framework where individuals (or firms, or other social or 
economic units that Weibull suggests) are the entities that are selected (or not), 
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Lawson notes, “it is specific practices … that are the individuals in competition here, 
not the human individuals per se” (Lawson 2003, 127, emphasis in original). Lawson 
also chooses social rules as the social replicators that are selected (or not) through the 
competition of social interactors. “What sort of thing or aspect might be interpreted 
as a social replicator, the entity that passes on its structure in replication? The answer 
… is social structure, and especially social rules including norms and 
conventions” (Lawson 2003, 128). 
Lawson makes this suggestion in the context of his PVRS model. Note that, in 
general, a PVRS model contains five essential features: (i) a population of interactors; 
(ii) the existence of a variety of replicators (which depends on an underlying variety-
generating mechanism); (iii) a replication mechanism through which replicators are 
reproduced; (iv) a selection mechanism through which the interactor is selected in the 
environment; and (v) some degree of independence between variety-generating 
mechanisms and selection mechanisms. 
Lawson’s PVRS model is a specific instance of this general formulation, in 
which social rules are the social replicators and social practices are the social 
interactors. In Lawson’s specification, one neither has to assume that human agents 
always follow the same strategies, nor that they revise these strategies at a constant 
frequency. In Lawson’s PVRS model, social rules are the (stable) replicator that 
corresponds to social practices — condition (a) is achieved — but human agents 
themselves can always choose a different rule of behavior at any moment and 
undertake a different social practice. The existence of a variety of rules that different 
agents might follow helps to verify condition (b), while the freedom these agents 
possess means that condition (c) is also satisfied. Thus, the variety of replicators (social 
rules) is enhanced by the diversity of active human individuals.  
The term “phenotype” could nevertheless be used to denote the human 
individual (or any other type of agent, such as firms or other social or economic 
units), and the term “genotype” could still be used to refer to characteristics of the 
individual (for example, the disposition, tendency, or propensity to engage given 
social rules). The correspondence that ensures the stability of the replicator is the one 
between replicator and interactor (social rules and social practices), not between the 
agent (the phenotype) and the replicator (the genotype) (the social rules or the 
propensity to engage on a given rule-following behavior, or to follow a given strategy, 
respectively). 
The choice of social practices as social interactors leads to a reformulation of the 
selection mechanism. Referring to the selection environment, Lawson states that “the 
environment of selection includes all other social practices that are in some way 
related to or connected to that population of practices that constitutes our primary 
focus. Interaction with the environment just is human interaction” (Lawson 2003, 
128). 
There are two ways in which the selection environment — the population of 
competing social practices — can cause the selection of social practices: (i) by causing 
(or even forcing) people to keep or to change their social practices (or at least 
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social practices (and hence social practices are indirectly selected through the selection 
of agents that engage in such practices). The first case (when the environment of 
selection leads agents to change their social practices) can be termed a direct selection of 
social practices, and the second case (when agents are themselves selected) an indirect 
selection of social practices. In both cases, the replicator is being selected through the 
selection of the interactors, but only in the latter case the human individual (or any 
other phenotype) is also himself/herself selected. The case of direct selection of social 
practices is close to Donald Campbell’s (1965) notion of vicarious selection, in which 
agents choose a given replicator before they are themselves selected through natural 
selection. 
So, when a social rule is selected (through social practices), one can interpret this 
fact both as meaning that agents keep practicing the social rule and that the agents 
who practice the social rule are still “alive.” Even though the social interactors are the 
social practices, the way the selection mechanism works implies that Lawson’s 
framework can achieve the same results as a framework, whereby selection acts upon 
human agents themselves. 
Thus, human individuals are no longer restricted to a passive role, and can have 
an active role. And it is through human agency that variety, reproduction, and 
selection occur. A particular social practice (of a human agent) is an interactor that 
must always correspond to a given replicator, but the human agent that engages in 
such social practice is not himself/herself “programmed” to always engage in a given 
social rule. Therefore, the conceptualization of human choice, as a result of a plurality 
of competing motivations, is not constrained under this view of evolutionary 
selection. 
 
Variety, Reproduction, and Selection 
 
In fact, Lawson’s PVRS model enables one to address a more general difficulty 
concerning the use of biological analogies. Nelson identifies three reasons why the 
identification of causal mechanisms of cultural evolution, as opposed to biological 
evolution, is not a straightforward exercise: 
 
First, for many areas of cultural evolution, the survival of the individuals 
and organizations involved simply is not at stake. Thus, there is often no 
clear analogy in cultural evolution to the mechanisms involving fitness of 
phenotypes in biological evolution. Second, the individuals, organizations, 
groups, that at any time hold particular beliefs or practices are not locked 
into them, as biological entities are to their genes, but can change them. 
Thus the relative importance of cultural traits can change, without any 
change in the population of the society to which that culture pertains. 
Third, while not over playing the role of conscious decision-making, in a 
wide range of circumstances beliefs about the value, and efficacy, of a 
particular cultural trait strongly influence whether that trait is adopted, 
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cases coercion, may be a central part of the selection process. (Nelson 
2006, 501) 
 
The difficulties Nelson points out can be found not only in Weibull’s models 
and evolutionary game theory, but also in any evolutionary model that conceptualizes 
agents (such as individuals or organizations) as interactors. A stable correspondence 
between a replicator and an interactor is essential for any explanatory framework 
based on the selection principle. For if an interactor could change his/her replicator 
at any moment, it would become difficult to distinguish evolutionary change from 
other types of change, and an epistemological problem of identification of replicators 
would arise.  
Lawson’s PVRS model provides a solution to the problems identified by Nelson 
for several reasons. First, it does not require a stable relationship between agents (be it 
individuals or organizations) and replicators, while still enabling a stable relationship 
between interactor and replicator (thus maintaining the biological analogy). Second, 
the concept of direct selection of social practices takes into account the case when the 
survival of agents (either individuals or organizations) is not at stake, and includes 
conscious decision-making (be it in the form of discussion, argument, persuasion, or 
even coercion) as part of the selection process. 
Lawson refers to human agency as the source of variety, reproduction, and 
selection in the social realm, but he does not elaborate on which particular features of 
human agency will constitute selection mechanisms, and which will be replication 
mechanisms or variety-generating mechanisms. A more concrete specification of 
which particular aspects of human agency enable variety, reproduction/replication, 
and selection is provided below. Nelson notes: 
 
Recognition of the purpose and thought that often go into innovation 
would seem to call for a view of the relevant “variation” in cultural 
evolution that is broader than in biological evolution. Variation in 
Darwinian biological evolutionary theory is variation of genes, and traits 
and behaviors, in an extant population at any time. This is the “stuff” on 
which selection works. However, in cultural evolution a good portion of 
the relevant variation is in human minds, and explored through 
calculation, discussion, and argument, rather than in actual practice. 
(Nelson 2006, 499) 
 
How can one provide a broader explanation of variety, replication, and 
selection? Research in behavioral economics can fruitfully illuminate this matter. One 
needs to keep in mind Kahneman’s (2003) distinction between “automatic” and 
“controlled” processes (like deliberate reasoning), as mentioned above. The main 
function of replication mechanisms is to reproduce codified information. The key 
role of variety-generating mechanisms, on the other hand, is to transform the existing 
(or generate new) codified information. From the cognitive processes described above, 
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because they play the role of reproducing dispositions, habits, and social rules. 
Evidently, replication can also occur through “controlled” processes like deliberate 
reasoning, whenever a rule is consciously represented and followed. But, in social 
activity, for the most part, rules are followed habitually and not through deliberate 
reasoning. 
In fact, deliberate reasoning is essentially a creative activity, in which agents can 
attempt to transform the rules or routines they follow. Hence, deliberate reasoning 
(insofar as it is not significantly caused, influenced, or constrained by the 
environment of selection) can be seen as a key ingredient to variety-generating 
mechanisms, enabling agents to create, invent, and innovate through the 
transformation of existing rules and routines. 
Note that deliberate reasoning can also lead to the decision of changing a social 
practice in the cases of vicarious selection, or direct selection of social practices noted 
above, and hence can be acting as a selection mechanism. However, deliberate 
reasoning will be acting as a selection mechanism whenever it is caused, influenced, or 
forced by the environment of social practices, and as a variety-generating mechanism 
otherwise. 
It is also the case that, when a disposition to act according to a different social 
rule is generated by the variety-generating mechanism, it will not necessarily be 
manifest in an actual behavior as a social practice since it still needs to be selected by 
the relevant mechanism in the environment of competing social practices. When a 
variety of social rules is generated (for example, because a tendency or disposition to 
adopt new social rules arises), it will not be necessarily materialized in actual social 
practices since the selection mechanism might prevent that from happening. 
To use Lawson’s (2003) example, in an international conference there may be a 
great variety of people from different countries, disposed to speak their own language, 
but the environment of selection (in which the dominant social practice very often is 
to speak in English) will prevent this variety from manifesting itself. So, all speakers 
will engage in the social practice of speaking in English, regardless of the language in 
which each person is more disposed to speak. Thus, changes in variety will not lead to 
any change in social practices, unless the social practices that correspond to the new 
social rules are selected. 
Another important point to bear in mind is that, very often, evolutionary 
processes will not be the only cause for human action. Sen (1997), for example, argues 
that ethical norms can be explained by evolutionary selection and also by moral 
reasoning. Referring to Immanuel Kant ([1788] 1949), Sen writes: 
 
The recent work on evolutionary game theory has thrown much light on 
how conventional rule-following … may emerge from evolutionary 
selection. Even though ultimately no individual may be directly concerned 
with the nature of the choice act, concern with the nature of the choice act 
may be instrumentally important in social rules of behavior that survive. 
This type of reasoning can be contrasted with behavioral rules being 
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how one “should” act … Consciously reflexive — rather than evolutionarily 
selected — use of ethical rule-following was most famously explored by 
Immanuel Kant (1788). That approach has been pursued in different 
forms in modern ethical writings as well. (Sen 1997, 748-749, emphasis 
original) 
 
It can be that after engaging in moral reasoning and self-reflection about human 
conduct, one comes to the conclusion that one must adopt a given social rule 
regardless of how favorable or unfavorable the selection environment is (to this social 
rule). In such a case, the new social rule is immediately undertaken as a social practice 
without any evolutionary process involved. Sen argues for the need to see evolutionary 
processes within a plurality of human motivations, which includes “consciously 
reflected use of ethical rule-following,” social commitment, and moral imperatives. 
Evolutionary causation will, in many cases, be a power present in reality among 
others. 
However, it can also be that some social rules are adopted only because of the 
evolutionary processes involved. Take, for example, the case of some new social rule 
that is generated by moral reasoning (in which moral reasoning acted as a variety-
generating mechanism). This rule may never become manifest in social practice 
without the aid of favorable environmental conditions. In such a case, moral 
reasoning acts in combination with the evolutionary process. That is, moral reasoning 
(acting as a variety-generating mechanism) generates a disposition to engage in a new 
social rule, but this latter is adopted only because the environment of selection is 
favorable. As Sen argues,  
 
[“consciously reflected use of ethical rule-following” and “evolutionary 
selected use of ethical rule-following”] don’t have to be just “alternatives.” 
Even if we deliberately choose behavioral norms on ethical (or social) 
grounds, their long-run survival can scarcely be completely independent of 
their impact on each other and the evolutionary processes that might come 
into play. (Sen 1997, 749, emphasis original) 
 
Sen’s remark reinforces the previously mentioned point that, in many cases, social 
rules that emerge through the variety-generating mechanism will be manifest in social 




So far in my analysis, I have maintained a distinction between the environment of 
selection, constituted by the competing social practices, and the other aspects of 
human behavior that may generate some variety of social rules (such as human 
dispositions, moral imperatives, psychological preferences, cultural conventions, or 
habits of thought). However, even though some distinction between selection 
mechanisms and variety-generating mechanisms is necessary for a Darwinian analysis, 
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[E]volutionary processes may not only influence the rules of conduct that 
we may consciously follow, but also our psychological preferences about the 
actions involved … The same can be said about the survival of ethical 
norms as well. Paying reflexive ethical attention to behavior neither 
nullifies, nor is nullified by, the importance of evolutionary forces. (Sen 
1997, 749, emphasis original) 
 
This means that habits, dispositions, and — what Kahneman (2003) terms — 
“automatic” processes, identified here as the underlying mechanisms for replication, 
can also be affected by the environment of selection. In what Lawson (2003) calls a 
strictly Darwinian framework, the variety-generating mechanism (or the variety of traits) 
is regarded as independent from the selection mechanism. Thus, human dispositions, 
social commitment, moral imperatives, psychological preferences, cultural 
conventions, habits of thought, and any feature that may influence the replication 
and variety of social rules, are independent from the environment of selection — i.e., 
the competing social practices — in a strictly Darwinian model. 
When the environment of selection has some sort of causal influence on the 
variety-generating mechanism, Lawson names the evolutionary process as a Lamarckian 
process. What Sen seems to be suggesting here is the possibility of some Lamarckian 
features (according to Lawson’s usage of the term “Lamarckian”). That is, the 
selection mechanism may causally influence the variety-generating mechanism since 
the fact that an evolutionary process changes psychological preferences can be seen as 
a source of variety of social rules. 
In biology, Lamarckian models represent situations where acquired traits are 
inherited. However, the general insight into the traditional formulation of the 
Lamarckian model as one, where acquired traits are inherited, is that the selection 
environment may influence the variety-generating mechanism, and hence impact the 
traits that are produced and selected (in biology, this would mean it influences the 
genetic features of the individual organism taken to be the phenotype, or displaying 
phenotypic characteristics; on this topic, see also Elsner 2012; Hédoin 2010; Pelligra 
2011; Villena and Villena 2004). Thus, the reformulation of interactors as social 
practices leads one to define a Lamarckian model as Lawson does — as a model where 
the selection environment influences the variety traits. 
In a Lamarckian model, the environment of selection can cause a change 
indirectly through its influence on the variety-generating mechanism, or directly — 
without causing any change in the variety-generating mechanism at all. The latter is 
the previously analyzed case, when the environment of selection causes, or even 
forces, changes in given social practices without affecting the agents’ preferences (or 
other sources of variety of social rules).  The former case, to which Sen seems to be 
referring here, is when the environment of selection works by first changing the 
underlying preferences (or other sources of variety of social rules), and then selecting 
social practices that reflect the modified social rules. 
So, although I posit that variety-generating and selection mechanisms are 
independent to some degree, changes in variety-generating mechanisms might also be 
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be causally affected by the selection environment. Lawson argues that one of the 
characteristics of the social realm is that variety-generating and selection mechanisms 
will likely be more often interdependent or interconnected in the social realm than in 
the biological realm. This possibility is not contemplated in evolutionary game theory, 
where only strictly Darwinian processes are at play. 
Nevertheless, for a Darwinian evolutionary analysis to be of some relevance, 
variety-generating and selection mechanisms need to be at least to some extent 
independent, so that one can then apply the distinction between variety-generating 
and selection mechanisms. It is when variety-generating and selection mechanisms are 
somewhat independent that Darwinian analysis in general, and the PVRS model in 
particular, will have a higher explanatory power. 
A model, allowing for the possibility of Lamarckian processes, enables a more 
complete conceptualization of the diverse motivations that explain human behavior, 
and so it is in line with conditions (b) and (c) above. This is so because such a model 
emphasizes the role of variety — condition (b) — and the freedom of human agents to 
reason and choose differently at any moment — condition (c). At the same time, the 
use of Lawson’s PVRS model (because of its specification that the social practices are 




In Weibull’s models, agents do not permanently optimize utility or payoffs. Rather, 
agents engage in rule-following behavior, while having the possibility of revising and 
choosing between competing strategies or social rules. So, Weibull’s analysis is closer 
to Sen’s contribution and to original institutional economics than standard game 
theory analysis. However, Weibull assumes that the average rate at which revision 
occurs — and the probability of changing the chosen option — are constants. This 
assumption is needed in Weibull’s models in order to assure the stability of the 
replicator by assuming that agents follow the same strategies or social rules (the 
replicators), or, if a change occurs, this change can be exactly modeled, so that 
evolutionary causation can be observed separately from other factors — that is, it is 
needed because of condition (a). 
These assumptions — namely, constant average review rates and constant 
probabilities of changing strategies — restrict the explanatory power of evolutionary 
models of behavior in two important ways. First, they restrict the variety between 
different human beings, hence violating condition (b). Second, these assumptions 
neglect the possibility that human agents may review strategies and choose differently 
at any time, hence violating condition (c). 
The violation of these conditions restricts the explanatory power of evolutionary 
game theory models, and generates inconsistencies between evolutionary game theory 
models and different streams of literature, such as recent developments in behavioral 
economics, the work of authors who are supportive of evolutionary game theory like 
Sen, or contributors that explicitly advocated the use of evolutionary models in 
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To focus on constant regularities or the “average” behavior of individuals (such 
as “average review rates” or constant probabilities) can be counter-productive in the 
context of Darwinian evolutionary processes, for it often leads one to add artificial 
constraints to variety. So, while Weibull’s models limit the explanatory power of 
Darwinian evolutionary models by imposing restrictions concerning how agents might 
act, Lawson’s PVRS model allows for exploring the diversity of characteristics of 
individuals as a source of variation (in addition to the variety that might already exist 
between different social practices).  
Furthermore, since in Lawson’s PVRS model, there need not be an exact 
correspondence between agents and their replicators, decisions to change social rules 
need not be exactly modeled in order to isolate evolutionary causation from other 
causes that may affect agents. This is the model more consistent with accounts of 
human agency, pointing in a direction that moves beyond the modeling of exact and 
predictable regularities of actual behavior (like that of Sen, but also Veblen and other 
original institutional economists who have emphasized evolutionary processes as 
explanatory tools). 
Evolutionary game theory undertakes its analysis at a more specific level than 
authors like Veblen, Sen, or Lawson. As a consequence, its models require stronger 
assumptions that are needed to address more specific phenomena. This means that 
the models used in evolutionary game theory will be useful in the particular cases 
where their assumptions apply (such as, for example, when addressing specific aspects 
of a given situation). Furthermore, Lawson’s PVRS model enables addressing Nelson’s 
(2006) criticisms of the use of biological analogies in cultural evolution, allowing for 
the fact that agents (both individuals and organizations) do not have a necessarily 
stable relationship to replicators, and conceptualizes conscious decision-making (be it 





Binmore, Ken. and Larry Samuelson. “Evolutionary Stability in Repeated Games Played by Finite 
Automata.” Journal of Economic Theory 57, 2 (1991): 278-305. 
———. “An Economic Perspective on the Evolution of Norms.” Journal of Institutional and Theoretical 
Economics 150, 1 (1994): 45-63. 
Campbell, Donald. “Variation and Selective Retention in Socio-Cultural Evolution.” In Social Change in 
Developing Areas: A Reinterpretation of Evolutionary Theory, edited by H.R. Barringer, G.I. Blanksten, 
and R.W. Mack, 19-49. Cambridge, MA: Schenkman, 1965. 
Dawkins, Richard. The Selfish Gene. Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 1976. 
———. “Replicator Selection and the Extended Phenotype.” Zeitschrift für Tierpsychologie 47, 1 (1978): 61-76. 
Elsner, Wolfram. “The Theory of Institutional Change Revisited: The Institutional Dichotomy, Its 
Dynamic, and Its Policy Implications in a More Formal Analysis.” Journal of Economic Issues 46, 1 
(2012): 1-44. 
Elsner, Wolfram, Torsten Heinrich and Henning Schwardt. The Microeconomics of Complex Economies. San 
Diego, CA: Academic Press, 2015. 
Hédoin, Cyril “Did Veblen Generalize Darwinism (And Why Does It Matter)?” Journal of Economic Issues 44, 
4 (2010): 963-989. 
Hull, David. “Units of Evolution: A Metaphysical Essay.” In The Philosophy of Evolution, edited by U.J. 





































  668 
 
Nuno Martins 
Kahneman, Daniel. “Maps of Bounded Rationality: Psychology for Behavioral Economics.” American 
Economic Review 93, 5 (2003): 1449-1475 
Kant, Immanuel. Critique of Practical Reason and Other Writings in Moral Philosophy. (Translation and editing 
by L. Beck). Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, [1788] 1949. 
Lawson, Tony. Reorienting Economics, London: Routledge, 2003. 
Lindgren, Kristian. “Evolutionary Dynamics in Game-Theoretic Models.” In The Economy as an Evolving 
Complex System II, edited by Brian Arthur, Steven Durlauf and David Lane, pp. 337-367. Reading, 
MA: Addison-Wesley, 1997. 
Martins, Nuno. “Rules, Social Ontology and Collective Identity.” Journal for the Theory of Social Behaviour 39, 
3 (2009): 323-344. 
———. The Cambridge Revival of Political Economy. London: Routledge, 2013. 
Maynard Smith, John. Evolution and the Theory of Games. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 
1982.  
Maynard Smith, John and George Robert Price. “The Logic of Animal Conflict.” Nature 246, 5427 (1973): 
15-18. 
Nelson, Richard. “Recent Evolutionary Theorizing About Economic Change.” Journal of Economic Literature 
33, 1 (1995): 48-90. 
———. “Evolutionary Social Science and Universal Darwinism.” Journal of Evolutionary Economics 15, 5 (2006): 
491-510. 
Nelson, Richard and Sidney Winter. An Evolutionary Theory of Economic Change: Cambridge, MA: Belknap 
Press, 1982. 
Pelligra, Vittorio. “Intentions, Trust and Frames: A Note on Sociality and the Theory of Games.” Review of 
Social Economy 69, 2 (2011): 163-188. 
Selten, Reinhard. “Evolution, Learning and Economic Behavior.” Games and Economic Behavior 3, 1 (1991): 
3-24. 
Sen, Amartya. Choice, Welfare and Measurement. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1982. 
———. On Ethics and Economics. New York, NY: Basil Blackwell, 1987. 
———. “Maximization and the act of choice”, Econometrica 65, 4 (1997): 745-779. 
———. Development as Freedom. Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 1999. 
———. Rationality and Freedom. Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press, 2002. 
Sugden, Robert. “The Evolutionary Turn in Game Theory.” Journal of Economic Methodology 8, 1 (2001a): 
113-130. 
———. “Ken Binmore’s Evolutionary Social Theory.” Economic Journal 111, 469 (2001b): F213-248. 
Veblen, Thorstein. “Why Is Economics Not an Evolutionary Science?” Quarterly Journal of Economics 12, 4 
(1898a): 373-397. 
———. “The Instinct of Workmanship and the Irksomeness of Labor.” American Journal of Sociology 4, 2 
(1898b): 187-201. 
———. Theory of the Leisure Class. New York, NY: Macmillan, 1899. 
———. The Instinct of Workmanship and the State of the Industrial Arts. New York, NY: Macmillan, 1914. 
Villena, Mauricio and Marcelo Villena. “Evolutionary Game Theory and Thorstein Veblen’s Evolutionary 
Economics: Is EGT Veblenian?” Journal of Economic Issues 38, 3 (2004): 585-610. 
Weibull, Jörgen. Evolutionary Game Theory. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1995. 
D
ow
nl
oa
de
d 
by
 [
U
ni
ve
rs
ity
 C
at
ol
ic
a 
Po
rt
ug
ue
sa
] 
at
 0
2:
35
 0
4 
M
ar
ch
 2
01
6 
